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Antitrust Policy and
Facebook’s Acquisition of Small Rivals
Ji Min (Sarah) Jeon

Abstract
This paper examines how current antitrust law can be better interpreted to address Facebook’s
alleged unfair monopoly. It begins with an overview of applicable antitrust laws, then investigates
how Section 2 of the Sherman Act can better be utilized. The paper delves into each component of
the rule that is required to find a violation, compares the indirect and direct methods of proving
monopoly power, proposes various methods of direct proof, and argues that agencies and courts
should also include Facebook’s acquisitions of smaller rivals in their analyses of the firm’s
anticompetitive conduct. The paper also briefly examines Section 7 of the Clayton Act and why
the FTC may have relied on Section 2 of the Sherman Act instead. Ultimately, the paper finds that
existing antitrust law is sufficient; however, agencies and courts should consider different ways of
interpreting and applying them.

I. Introduction
With “Big Tech” firms such as Facebook, Google, and Amazon increasingly coming under
public scrutiny for their alleged anticompetitive wielding of their market power, the adequacy of
antitrust rules in addressing such matters has been brought into question. While there are many
forms of anticompetitive conduct that may be analyzed, such as cutting off potential competitors’
access to APIs (as Facebook allegedly did)1 or requiring browsers to make a firm’s search engine
the preset default general search engine (as Google allegedly did),2 it is particularly important to
examine dominant digital platforms’ acquisition of small rivals, as it is alleged to be a key strategy
employed by many dominant platforms to maintain their market power. 3 It must also be noted that
besides antitrust law, few mechanisms exist that can effectively check the power of such dominant
firms.4 It is especially important to look at the acquisition of small rivals because they tend to fall
under the radar when they happen. Indeed, at the time of acquisition many of the acquired
companies have zero, or at least very small, market shares.5 Despite the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR)
Act, which requires companies to file premerger notifications with the Federal Trade Commission
and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department for certain acquisitions, 6 many smaller or less
significant acquisitions fall below the transaction size threshold and thus take effect without proper
inspection.7 However, it is precisely such small, differentiated rivals that may have turned into
formidable competitors to dominant platforms, had the acquisitions not occurred. It can be argued
that such small acquisitions by dominant platforms effectively stifle competition, allow firms to
unfairly maintain their dominant status, and ultimately harm consumers. Therefore, we must
examine current antitrust law and its effectiveness in addressing such small acquisitions.
This paper will examine the foundational antitrust laws and the Court’s interpretations of
them regarding the Facebook case to determine whether current antitrust policy is effective at
addressing the acquisitions of small rivals by dominant platforms. It will also analyze and compare
alternative frameworks and methods brought forth by scholars in the field to ultimately propose
recommendations regarding how antitrust policy can better be utilized to prove dominant
platforms’, and specifically Facebook’s, possession of an unfair monopoly, after which further

1

Substitute Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief ¶ 133, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., 1:20-cv03590-JEB (D.D.C. Sep. 8, 2021).
2
Amended Complaint ¶ 156, U.S. and Plaintiff States v. Google LLC, 1:20-cv-03010-APM (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2021).
3
FTC, Non-HSR Reported Acquisitions by Select Technology Platforms, 2010–2019: An FTC Study, (September 15,
2021), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/non-hsr-reported-acquisitions-select-technologyplatforms-2010-2019-ftc-study/p201201technologyplatformstudy2021.pdf
4
One may argue that broad-brush regulation should be the preferred method, but this paper will rely on the notion
that antitrust law’s individualized approach is more adequate to such dominant digital platforms, considering that
they have high degrees of differentiation.
5
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 Yale L.J. 1952, 2042 (2021).
6
15 U.S.C. § 18a
7
As of February 23, 2022, the threshold is $101 million in transactions size. FTC, HSR threshold adjustments and
reportability for 2022 (Feb. 11, 2022), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/competition-matters/2022/02/hsr-thresholdadjustments-reportability-2022. Although the two main mergers discussed in this paper, those of Instagram and
WhatsApp by Facebook, did in fact require HSR Act inspections, it is nevertheless worth noting that mergers of
smaller size, especially those which may end up having anticompetitive implications, may never receive proper
premerger inspection.

measures, such as orders of divesture or enjoinments, can be taken to effectively check such course
of conduct.8
It is worth mentioning that, of the many existing dominant platforms, this paper specifically
focuses on Facebook’s acquisitions of small rivals for several reasons. First, with Facebook having
engaged in more than 90 acquisitions, the sheer number of acquisitions Facebook has pursued
allows one to comprehensively analyze a variety of acquisitions surrounding a single firm and
make comparisons between them. In addition, Facebook has come under constant scrutiny for its
acquisitions, with the recent cases brought against Facebook by the FTC and the States Attorney
General focusing on such acquisitions, among other things. While it is yet to be determined
whether such acquisitions were indeed anticompetitive, the fact that such implications were made
suggests that the acquisitions may have anticompetitive connotations. Finally, with Facebook
commonly considered to be one of the primary dominant platforms, and considering that it
possesses an arguably dominant stake in the personal social networking services market, the
approach antitrust law takes with it will set a precedent that will affect other “Big Tech” platforms
as well as smaller firms that may become the next Facebook. On a cautionary note, while some of
the findings of the paper may be generalizable to other dominant digital platforms, and despite
much previous literature tending to group platforms such as Amazon, Google, and Facebook into
a larger category of “multi-sided” or “two-sided” platforms,9 the author does not intend to draw
conclusions regarding the larger space of dominant platforms in general, considering the paper’s
focus on Facebook. Ultimately, this paper finds that the existing antitrust laws are sufficient to
address Facebook’s alleged monopoly and proposes new methods to interpret the rules.
II. Antitrust Laws
Before delving further into the discussion, it is important to touch on the foundational
antitrust laws, for these are the laws plaintiffs will argue that firms violated in their mergers and
acquisitions.
To begin with, Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns “every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations.”10 The long-standing requirement for monopoly maintenance under Section 2 is both (1)
the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful . . . maintenance of
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident. 11 Regarding the first element, monopoly power means
“substantial market power that is durable rather than fleeting – market power being the ability to

Although this paper will focus its analysis on how antitrust law can best be utilized to prove Facebook’s possession
of an unfair monopoly, for a discussion on antitrust remedies against dominant platforms, See Herbert Hovenkamp,
supra note 5, at 2005-2039.
9
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 5; Rob Frieden, The Internet of Platforms and Two-Sided Markets:
Implications for Competition and Consumers, 63 Vill. L. Rev. 269 (2018); David S. Evans, Multisided Platforms,
Dynamic Competition, and the Assessment of Market Power for Internet-Based Firms, Coase-Sandor Working Paper
Series in Law and Economics, No. 753 (2016).
10
15 U.S.C. § 2
11
Memorandum Opinion, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., 1:20-cv-03590-JEB, 8 (D.D.C. Jan. 1, 2022) (quoting United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
8

raise prices profitability above those that would be charged in a competitive market.” 12 It is
commonly understood that there are largely two methods of inferring market power: the direct
method and indirect method. The direct method, according to the Supreme Court, requires the
plaintiff to supply direct proof that a firm has in fact profitably raised prices substantially above
the competitive level. 13 It must be noted that other suggestions have been made as to direct
methods of measurement of market power in the case that a product or service is provided free of
charge and therefore has no price on which to base the analysis on. This paper will discuss such
methods later.14 The indirect method is more widely used, in which plaintiffs and courts examine
market structure in search of circumstantial evidence of monopoly power. 15 In such cases, it has
been the norm to define a market, demonstrate a firm’s share within the defined market, and
demonstrate that there are sufficient barriers to entry.16 Again, this paper will discuss each element
of the indirect method in more detail later. Regarding the second element, it must be noted that
Section 2 does not punish the mere possession or exercise of monopoly power; rather, it addresses
only the anticompetitive acquisition or maintenance of such power. That is, the mere possession
of monopoly and unlawful monopolization are to be distinguished. 17 It must also be noted that
both the States Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) invoked Section 2
in their complaints against Facebook. 18
Meanwhile, Section 1 of the Sherman Act states, “every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 19 It must be noted that in effect, the conspiracy must
comprise an agreement, understanding or meeting of the minds between at least two competitors
or potential competitors.20 That is, a Section 1 violation requires there to be at least two or more
actors, and thus cannot be applied to unilateral monopolistic conduct or attempts – Section 2 is
often applied instead in such unilateral cases, allowing antitrust enforcers to reach conduct engaged
in unilaterally by a firm that has achieved, or dangerously threatens to achieve, monopoly power. 21
Another important antitrust law when it comes to cases brought against dominant platforms
is Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions where “in any line of
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."22 It must
be noted that while its coverage is not limited to firms of any particular size or market share, or to
those with any particular kind of competitive relationship,23 and that the Celler-Kefauver Act also
12

Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Chapter 1, The United
States Department of Justice Archives, https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firmconduct-under-section-2-sherman-act-chapter-1#N_6, (last visited Apr. 11, 2022).
13
Supra note 11 at 8-9.
14
Infra Section III.B.
15
Supra note 11 at 9.
16
Id.
17
United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.)
18
Supra note 1, ¶ ¶ 235, 242; Complaint ¶ ¶ 256-262, New York v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03589-JEB (D.D.C.
Dec. 9, 2020).
19
15 U.S.C. § 1
20
Elements of the Offense, The United States Department of Justice Archives,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/antitrust-resource-manual-1-attorney-generals-policy-statement, (last visited
Apr. 11, 2022).
21
Supra note 12.
22
15 U.S.C. § 18
23
Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 2040.

enabled Section 7 to reach vertical and conglomerate mergers as well as horizontal mergers, 24
courts have been criticized for reading the law too narrowly.25
In addition, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Act declares “unfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”
unlawful.26 The Supreme Court has said that all violations of the Sherman Act also violate the FTC
Act. Although only a handful of cases in the past decade have relied on stand-alone Section 5
authority,27 the FTC Act also reaches other practices that harm competition, but that may not fit
neatly into categories of conduct formally prohibited by the Sherman Act. It must be noted that
only the FTC brings cases under the FTC Act. 28
This paper will focus its discussion on the effectiveness of Section 2 of the Sherman Act
as well as Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which are the antitrust laws most relevant to acquisitions.
III. Utilizing Section 2 of the Sherman Act
With both the States Attorney General and the FTC having brought antitrust complaints
against Facebook under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,29 the law and its interpretations warrant
further examination. The first step in proving the offense of monopoly maintenance under
Section 2 is demonstrating the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, where
monopoly power is “the power to control prices or exclude competition.”30 That is, “a firm is a
monopolist if it can profitability raise prices substantially above the competitive level.”31 As
discussed above, there are largely two methods of inferring market power: the indirect method
and direct method. This section will first discuss the indirect method, in which courts rely on
“circumstantial evidence of monopoly power,”32 and each of its elements, before examining
methods of supplying direct proof of monopoly power.
A. Monopoly Power: Indirect Method
1. Market Definition
The first step in indirectly demonstrating possession of monopoly power is defining the
relevant market. It is well established that an antitrust market includes “two components: the
product market and the geographic market.”33 In particular, a relevant product market includes

24

American Antitrust Institute, AAI PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY WORKSHOP ON MERGERS: National Press
Club - Washington, D.C. – October 11, 2013: SUMMARY OF SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT,
https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Section-7.pdf
25
Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 2041.
26
15 U.S.C. § 45
27
Debbie Feinstein, Bureau of Competition, A few words about Section 5, Federal Trade Commission,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/competition-matters/2015/03/few-words-about-section-5, (last visited Apr. 11,
2022).
28
The Antitrust Laws, Federal Trade Commission, https://www.ftc.gov/advice-guidance/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws, (last visited Apr. 11, 2022).
29
Supra note 18.
30
Supra note 11, at 8.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 9.
33
Id. at 10 (quoting Sky Angel U.S., LLC v. Nat’l Cable Satellite Corp., 947 F. Supp. 2d at 102).

“all products reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes.”34 A reiteration of
this definition is all products “roughly equivalent to another for the use to which [they are] put”35
That is, “courts look at whether two products can be used for the same purpose, and, if so,
whether and to what extent purchasers are willing to substitute one for the other.”36 A key notion
in the determination of the boundaries of a relevant product market is interchangeability, or
substitutability.
When it comes to Facebook’s case, the FTC has, at this point, succeeded in claiming that
Facebook’s relevant product market is personal social networking (“PSN”) services. To do so,
the FTC, which had the burden of defining the relevant market and providing the reasoning for
the definition, had to do two things: “provide a definition of PSN services” and “further explain
whether and why other, non-PSN services available to the public either are or are not reasonably
interchangeable substitutes with PSN services.”37 The FTC defined PSN services as “online
services that enable and are used by people to maintain personal relationships and share
experiences with friends, family, and other personal connections in a shared social space,” and
listed three key elements of such services.38
It must be noted here that, although the FTC did not use the exact term, the market of
PSN services appears to be a “cluster market,” a market that consists of noncompeting goods. 39
Facebook, with its “variety of noncompeting services, including photo posting, video posting,
messaging, bulletin boards, discussion groups, timelines of other users, business services, a
dating service, as well as the ability to formulate and preserve a profile of personal data,” can be
said to be a cluster of noncompeting services. The FTC also alludes to this fact by stating that
PSN services have multiple “features.” 40 In order to locate power in a cluster market rather than
in the respective markets of each individual good, however, it is not enough for a firm to simply
sell multiple noncompeting products; rather, it must be plausible that the act of clustering in itself
creates power in that customers prefer the grouping of products rather than any single one and
that it makes it difficult for competitors to enter into competition with the cluster. 41 When it
comes to Facebook, it is plausible that users would prefer the services listed above to be
centralized in a single platform than have to jump between different websites or apps to use
different services. Accordingly, it would make it difficult for competitors with just one or a few
of the services to compete with Facebook. That is, Facebook’s individual services do not
compete in each of their respective markets such as the photo posting market or the messaging
market; rather, it must be recognized that Facebook, as a collective of such individual services,
competes in the cluster market of PSN services. Hovenkamp also points out that “in many cluster
34

Id. (quoting Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 52).
Id. (quoting Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 437 (3d Cir. 1997)).
36
Id. at 11. (quoting United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d at 51).
37
Memorandum Opinion, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., 1:20-cv-03590-JEB, 21, (D.D.C. June 18, 2021).
38 Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief ¶ ¶ 52-55, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., 1:20-cv-03590-JEB
(D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2020).
According to the FTC, personal social networking services are distinguished by three key elements, in that (1)
“personal social networking services are built on a social graph that maps the connections between users and their
friends, family, and other personal connections,” (2) “personal social networking services include features that many
users regularly employ to interact with personal connections and share their personal experiences in a shared social
space, including in a one-to-many “broadcast” format,” and (3) “personal social networking services include
features that allow users to find and connect with other users.”
39
Herbert Hovenkamp, Digital Cluster Markets, Col. Bus. L. Rev., 26 (2022).
40
Supra note 38.
41
Id.
35

markets, the precise aggregation of products and services changes over time and, in any event, is
not very important.”42 That is, while the FTC, instead of enumerating the services that are
included in the cluster market of PSN services, employed the vague, encompassing terms of
“features” and “social graph,”43 this is not necessarily an issue. Rather, it is important to
recognize that it is the clustering of such services, even if the individual items may change, that
provides value to consumers, creates entry barriers, and constitutes its own market of PSN
services.
The FTC also addressed the issue of detailing which categories of services fall within the
boundaries of PSN services and which do not based on substitutability. While the initial
complaint only argued that online video or audio consumption-focused services, mobile
messaging services, and specialized social networking services were not reasonable substitutes, 44
it is notable that the amended complaint added others to the list, perhaps in preparation for the
market share analysis that was to be carried out in response to the Court’s criticism of the FTC’s
first complaint that Facebook’s market share was not adequately explained. 45 In particular, the
amended complaint alleged, and Facebook did not object, that “PSN is distinct from, and not
reasonably interchangeable with, online services that focus on the broadcast or discovery of
content based on users’ interests rather than their personal connections. Prominent examples are
Twitter, Reddit, and Pinterest. These services do not focus on connecting friends and family.”46
That is, such services are differentiated from Facebook in how people discover content or make
connections on their respective platforms. It is also particularly notable that regarding “online
video or audio consumption-focused services,” perhaps in anticipation of an argument centered
around the growing platform, the FTC appended a discussion on TikTok, which it argues is “a
prominent example of a content broadcasting and consumption service that is not an acceptable
substitute for personal social networking services. TikTok users primarily view, create, and share
video content to an audience that the poster does not personally know, rather than connect and
personally engage with friends and family. The purpose for which users employ TikTok, and the
predominant form of interaction on the platform, is not driven by users’ desire to interact with
networks of friends and family.”47
The FTC supported such a definition and the classification of substitutes and nonsubstitutes by arguing that Facebook’s own statements and internal documents indicate that it
recognizes that Facebook is providing PSN services and that it understands the distinction
between PSN services and other services. 48
Taking such non-substitutes out of the equation, the FTC alleged that the PSN market in
the United States includes only Snapchat, Google+, Myspace, Path, MeWe, Orkut, and
Friendster. Somewhat striking is Facebook’s lack of objection. It is plausible that it could have
argued that other services, such as Twitter, is a substitute to some degree, considering that many
people also use Twitter to keep up with personal connections. 49 In the event that this argument
42

Supra note 39, at 24.
Supra note 38.
44
Id. ¶ ¶ 58-60.
45
Supra note 37, at 2.
46
Supra note 1, ¶ 174.
47
Id. ¶ 176.
48
Id. ¶ 177.
49
Twitter itself states: “Twitter is a service for friends, family, and coworkers to communicate and stay connected
through the exchange of quick, frequent messages.” What is Twitter?, Twitter Help Center,
https://help.twitter.com/en/resources/new-user43

was upheld by the Court, this may have been in Facebook’s favor in the calculation of market
share. Nevertheless, as of now, the Court has found that the FTC has plausibly established the
definition and boundaries of PSN services.
Even from the first step of defining the relevant market, the indirect method reveals some
limitations. To begin with, defining a relevant market is a binary concept; that is, it can only
count a product as inside or outside a market. 50 This is clear in the FTC’s painstaking efforts to
lay out and explain which firms fall into the relevant market and which do not. While this binary
nature may not present a problem in markets in which products are largely identical, such as the
market for electricity or virgin aluminum, it poses a significant problem in differentiated
markets, in which products may not be complete substitutes of each other but may still possess a
degree of substitutability. Of course, however, binary market definitions cannot “meter rates of
substitution”51 to account for the varying degrees of substitutability. Despite the courts having
stated that the process of defining a market involves determining “whether and to what extent
purchasers are willing to substitute one for the other (emphasis added),” 52 it is impossible to state
that a certain product is, say, 50% inside a market and 50% outside of it and thus should
contribute only 50% of its market share to a firm’s market share analysis. As such, such market
definitions have the risk of being either too narrow, in which only complete functional
substitutes are included, or too broad, in which differentiated products that may present different
advantages to users, are included. Even when it comes to Facebook’s relevant market of PSN
services, one could argue that a broader market definition of “social media” platforms in general,
which would include Twitter and TikTok, should be utilized, especially considering that while
such platforms might not provide users with completely substitutable functions, they could be
somewhat substitutable competitors with Facebook in the eyes of advertisers in the social
advertising space. On the other hand, a narrower market could be argued for in that platforms
such as Snapchat,53 which was included in the FTC’s definition of the PSN market, are not
complete functional substitutes to Facebook.
While so far, the FTC, the Court, and Facebook have agreed on the definition and
boundaries of Facebook’s relevant product market, the binary nature of such a definition makes
it susceptible to future contention. Some have argued that to the extent market shares are used
they should be calculated using different plausible definitions of the relevant set of substitutes. 54
However, this could create complications down the line when calculating market shares. For
instance, if one market definition revealed that the firm had a 50% market share, and another
established a 70% market share, it would most likely be in the interest of the defendant to argue
for use of the first definition and be in the interest of the plaintiff to argue for use of the second.
faq#:~:text=Twitter%20is%20a%20service%20for,are%20searchable%20on%20Twitter%20search., (last visited
Apr. 11, 2022). While some may argue that such “personal” social networking is not the main value Twitter confers
to users, that is not of concern in this discussion, in which the key idea is “substitutability.” That is, even if a
product’s main value proposition is not directly in line with the market in question, if consumers are willing to
substitute one product for the other, they should both be considered to be in the same market.
50
Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 1961.
51
Id.
52
Supra note 36.
53
While Facebook users can post various forms of content to their newsfeed, such as text or photos, and while such
content does not disappear unless removed, Snapchat users mainly post content in the form of pictures, which
disappear after a short period of time. While such differences may render the two platforms not complete substitutes
to users, regardless, Snapchat fits within the boundaries of FTC’s definition of the PSN market.
54
David S. Evans, Multisided Platforms, Dynamic Competition, and the Assessment of Market Power for InternetBased Firms, Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics, No. 753, 31 (2016).

While it is usually inevitable that disputes regarding the appropriate method of market share
calculation will arise throughout the course of an antitrust litigation, allowing multiple market
definitions would reveal complications that would not be present if one definition was settled
upon.
In addition, it must be noted that whether a certain firm falls within the boundaries is
subject to change. That is, a nascent firm which did not have functionalities that were
substitutable for the product in question’s uses at the time the market definition and boundaries
were set in a litigation could add such features and become a substitute in later years. In fact, the
FTC alleges that it was for this reason that Facebook acquired WhatsApp; despite WhatsApp
being a mobile messaging app at the time of acquisition, the FTC alleges that Facebook feared
that WhatsApp would enter the personal social networking market at competitive scale and
undermine or displace Facebook’s personal social networking monopoly. 55 That is, while it is
impossible to know for sure the counterfactual of what would have happened had Facebook not
acquired WhatsApp, one can speculate that WhatsApp, had it entered the PSN market, would
have changed Facebook’s market share in the market by doing so. While this paper will touch on
Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp again later on,56 in this section it is important to recognize
that firms are not perpetually confined to their location inside or outside a market; such positions
are subject to change. This is an especially critical point in the social networking service space,
where growth can happen relatively quickly.57 With antitrust litigations usually taking place over
multiple years, it is plausible that the need to redefine the market and recalculate market shares
may arise, perhaps even multiple times, as the competitive landscape changes.
2. Market Share
The second step in indirectly demonstrating monopoly power is calculating a firm’s market
share in the relevant product and geographic market defined in the first step. While traditionally,
such market share would be calculated by dividing a company’s revenue over a certain period of
time by the market’s total revenue over the same period, it is impossible to utilize this method with
regard to Facebook’s share of the PSN market, considering that Facebook does not generate any
direct revenue from the provision of such services. 58 Instead, the FTC utilized the three
consumption metrics of time spent, daily active users (“DAUs”), and monthly active users
(“MAUs”)59 to demonstrate that Facebook held a consistently high share in each of the metrics
and that it thus maintained a dominant share of the United States PSN market.60 The FTC cited
multiple reasons why such metrics were reliable measures of market share. To begin with, it argued
that such numbers are related to a PSN service’s attractiveness, and therefore its competitive
significance.61 It is reasonable to infer that a service with more users and on which users spend
55

Supra note 38, ¶ 108.
Infra Section III.C.
57
For example, Tik Tok gained on average about 20 million new users per month over the period of September 2016
to mid-2018. Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, The rise of social media, Our World in Data, https://ourworldindata.org/rise-ofsocial-media, (last visited Apr. 11, 2022). Facebook is also alleged to have shown high growth rates: the FTC
alleges that between May 2007 and May 2008, Facebook’s monthly active users grew 34%. Supra note 1, ¶ 43.
58
For a discussion on how Facebook generates revenue, see infra Section III.A 4.
59
Supra note 1, ¶ ¶ 190-204.
60
The FTC alleged that each market share calculation demonstrated that Facebook had at least a 65% market share
since 2012. Id.
61
Supra note 1, ¶ 192.
56

more time is one that is preferred by users and has a larger share of the market. The FTC
corroborated its use of such methods by mentioning that such metrics are commonly used and
reported on by both Facebook and other PSN services to assess both their own performance as
well as rivals’ competitive significance. 62 Finally, the FTC pointed out foreign antitrust authorities’
use of such metrics in their respective conclusions of Facebook’s possession of market power. 63
Although Facebook argued against use of all the aforementioned metrics, the Court
concluded that the FTC had plausibly alleged Facebook’s maintenance of a dominant market share,
taking the assumptions in the allegation as true. 64 While this does not mean that the Court
concluded that the FTC had sufficiently proved Facebook’s dominant market share and while
Facebook could of course disprove such allegations as the litigation progresses, it is nevertheless
important that the Court deemed such measures of market share appropriate in alleging Facebook’s
dominant market share.
However, some limitations and risks of the indirect method arise in the second step of
demonstrating market power as well. As Facebook noted in its Motion to Dismiss, the data used
in calculating market share metrics may be unreliable.65 While the Court stated that at the current
juncture it did not have the basis to address the issue of reliability, this issue is a valid one that is
sure to arise in the later stages of this litigation. For example, it is highly likely that Facebook will
contest FTC’s complete reliance on Comscore data again down the line. In preparation of such an
attack, the FTC should be ready to argue for why Comscore is a reliable data source by presenting
examples of major digital platforms utilizing it, or procure data from other sources as well to show
that Facebook is shown to have a dominant market share across various data sources.
3. Barriers to Entry
The third and final step in demonstrating market power is establishing that there are
sufficient barriers to entry which protect the firm’s possession of a dominant share of a relevant
market. That is, it is not enough to simply show that a firm has a dominant market share; it must
also be proven that it is durable due to certain features of the market. It has been established that
“for antitrust purposes, a barrier to entry is best defined as any factor that permits firms already in
the market to earn returns above the competitive level while deterring outsiders from entering.”66
The FTC alleges, and the Court concluded that such allegations were sufficient at the stage
of evaluating Facebook’s Motion to Dismiss, that “Facebook’s dominant position in the U.S.
personal social networking market is durable due to significant entry barriers, including direct
network effects and high switching costs.”67 Direct network effects refer to “user-to-user effects
that make a personal social network more valuable as more users join the service.”68 The FTC
applies this definition to the PSN market, in that with a “core purpose” of the market being to
“connect and engage with personal connections,” such services become more valuable the more
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connections one can find on them, making it difficult for a new entrant to displace an established
personal social network in which users’ friends and family already participate. 69 The FTC further
alleged that a Facebook executive and Mark Zuckerberg himself recognized the presence of such
network effects, an allegation which the Court seemed to highly value. 70 The notion that digital
platforms enjoy network effects is rarely disputed, 71 and the Court expressed that Facebook also
did not meaningfully contest. 72
On another note, the FTC also alleges that Facebook’s users face high switching costs,
which also present another significant entry barrier for other firms into the PSN market. That is,
over time, Facebook’s users build a collection of connections and content. However, they cannot
easily transfer this collection to another PSN service.73 For instance, Facebook users cannot easily
transfer their collection of posts and photos to, say, Google+; it would require a significant time
investment to make connections on Google+ with everyone they were already connected with on
Facebook, and data related to posts, such as the dates they were posted or comments that other
users left on them, would be virtually impossible to transfer. This lack of portability74 leads to high
switching costs, 75 which creates significant consumer lock-in and barriers to entry. According to
the FTC, not only are switching costs high, but they can increase over time—a “ratchet effect”—
as each user’s collection of content and connections, and investment of effort in building each,
continually builds with use of the service.76 That is, the more time and effort a user vests into a
PSN service, building content and connections within it, the more difficult they will find it to
switch to another PSN service, where they would have to build a new collection of content and
connections. The FTC alleges that Facebook also recognized the presence of such ratchet effects. 77
Although not touched upon by the FTC, it must be mentioned, assuming that both network
effects and high switching costs are present in PSN markets, that network effects and high
switching costs may create synergistic effects. That is, due to high switching costs, users will
continue to use a certain service. The continued presence of such users will present network effects,
making the service more valuable to other users and inducing them to join. The addition of more
connections will then further increase the switching costs. Taking the FTC’s allegations as true,
the relationship between such network effects and high switching costs may further erect
significant barriers to entry.
Unlike the discourse on network effects, there is some debate in whether switching costs
in PSN markets are indeed high; in fact, some have argued that switching costs are low in that a
user can switch from one platform to another easily and cheaply. 78 This is true to a degree. Unlike
other markets such as that of cellular networks, in which a user would usually need only one
69
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provider and would incur both monetary and time costs to switch from one to another, the PSN
market is one in which a user can have accounts on multiple PSN services and easily switch from
viewing or posting on one service to another; all it would take to do so is to open a different app
or web page. Indeed, one scholar points out that Americans switched from Friendster to MySpace
and then from MySpace to Facebook, due to such low switching costs. 79 On the other hand, it
could be argued that simply switching one’s attention between apps or web pages and switching
one’s collection of content and connections to another service are different matters, with the former
presenting a low switching cost and the latter presenting a high switching cost. To gain further
insight into how high or low consumers perceive the switching costs to be, a qualitative analysis,
such as the administration of surveys, may be helpful.
4. Facebook as a Multi-Sided Market
It must be noted that much literature surrounding antitrust and digital platforms has
categorized Facebook as a multi-sided (or at least two-sided) digital platform. 80 Hovenkamp
defines a digital platform as a website, app, or other digital venue that interacts commercially with
one or more groups of users, and specifically a “two-sided” digital platform as one that facilitates
activities involving at least two interdependent groups of users.81 As Shelanski, Knox & Dhilla
point out, many digital platforms are three-sided and so can be characterized both as matching two
sides that each generate positive externalities (users and content providers), whilst also providing
an audience for a third side that might not deliver positive externalities (advertisers).82 While it is
debatable whether users and content providers on Facebook can be considered two separate sides,
this paper will utilize the term “multi-sided” to encompass both definitions.
It is important to point out that neither the FTC nor the Court has explicitly used the terms
“multi-sided platform” or “two-sided platform” to characterize the PSN market. Nevertheless, they
do recognize that Facebook’s business model is based on mining the personal data of its users and
selling behavioral advertising. 83 That is, they understand that there are multiple parties involved in
the monetization of its product: users who use Facebook to access its core function of PSN services,
and advertisers who wish to display their ads to specific sets of users. The FTC also alleges that
Facebook’s monopoly power has caused harm to not only users, but also advertisers, and even
proceeds to list the multiple benefits to advertisers of additional competition. 84 However, its
discussion of whether Facebook possesses monopoly power is limited to the PSN market; that is,
although the FTC does lay out a definition of social advertising, it does not attempt to calculate
Facebook’s share in this market. 85 Traditional antitrust cases have contemplated one-sided markets
and thus corresponding monopoly power analyses were regarding the market in which revenue
occurred. However, in the case of Facebook, monopoly power analyses were carried out regarding
the “side,” PSN services, which generated little to no direct revenue (some have even argued that
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it generates negative direct revenue 86), while the “side” in which Facebook actually generates
revenue, the provision of advertising services, was largely left untouched. However, many have
argued that in such market power analyses of multi-sided digital platforms, one must also account
for the other “sides” of a platform as well, taking their interdependencies into account. 87
This begs the question of whether, despite Facebook being a multi-sided platform, it is
sufficient to prove market power on one side when utilizing the indirect method. That is, must
agencies and courts engage in the exercise of defining the market, calculating market share, and
demonstrating barriers to entry in the other, advertising “side” of the market on top of carrying out
such analyses regarding the PSN “side”? To answer this question, it is important to first understand
Facebook’s business model. Evans’ characterization of online multi-sided platforms sums it up
nicely: such platforms, including Facebook, make the platform “free” to one group of participants,
or even subsidize those participants, and earn profits from the other groups of participants who
they do charge.”88 Evans argues that the real price to users can even be considered negative, in that
consumers do not pay for obtaining the content or services yet receive value by coming to these
platforms.89 On the other side, advertisers pay to present advertising or other marketing messages
to the consumers that are aggregated on the platform; this is where Facebook makes revenue – in
fact, Facebook’s public earnings reports show that Facebook earned virtually all of its revenue
from advertising in 2021.90
In the case of Facebook, it is reasonable to believe that monopoly power on the PSN side
of the market would translate to market power in advertising. That is, the core value of Facebook
to advertisers is Facebook’s sheer user base and its ability to present highly targeted advertisements.
Assuming that Facebook has monopoly power in the PSN market, it is logical to conclude that
thanks to its long-preserved dominant status, not only does it have the largest number of “eyeballs”
which advertisers seek, but also that it has consistently accumulated more data than competitors
over the years to strengthen its targeting abilities. This would reasonably make it the preferred
platform by advertisers – why would they go to other platforms when Facebook is obviously the
best choice in terms of user base and targeting? As such, Facebook’s monopoly power in the PSN
market would allow it to enjoy market power in the advertising market.
Some have argued that the interrelationship between the multiple sides of a platform means
that it is not possible for a multi-sided platform to have market power on only one side of the
market.91 While they are not stating that it is always sufficient to show market power in just one
side to conclude that a firm has market power as a platform, in Facebook’s case, it is hard to
conceive of a situation in which monopoly power in the PSN market would not translate to market
power in the related advertising market. As such, considering Facebook’s business model in which
the willingness to pay of advertisers depends on Facebook’s dominance of the PSN market, this
paper argues that when using the indirect method of proving monopoly power, proving Facebook’s
monopoly power in just the PSN market is sufficient.
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B. Monopoly Power: Direct Method
An alternative method of demonstrating monopoly power is direct measures, which rely
on empirical measurement of output responses to price changes.92 The Court in the Facebook
case stated that employing the direct method requires the plaintiff to supply direct proof that a
firm has in fact profitably raised prices substantially above the competitive level.93 Hovenkamp
explains that such direct proof relies on estimates of firm elasticity of demand, evidenced mainly
by a firm’s price-cost margins or output responses to price changes.94 However, it is recognized
that proof of high prices may not be the only means of demonstrating monopoly power; proof of
pricing discontinuity, which refers to a sudden change in the firm’s pricing or output behavior
following the allegedly anticompetitive act, 95 or comparison between the industrial sector under
consideration and a competitive benchmark, 96 may be other methods to establish direct proof.
Such direct measures have some obvious advantages over the indirect method. With the
direct method rendering market definition and market share calculation unnecessary, it
circumvents the tedious, often inaccurate process of enumerating firms that fall within a market
and do not. Unlike the indirect method which has the critical disadvantage of being binary, the
direct method can account for varying degrees of substitutability, in that it can factor in, for
example, the rate at which consumers change their responses to changes in price.
It must be noted that although the FTC focused on proving Facebook’s monopoly power
via the indirect method, it nevertheless employed some direct proof as well. To begin with, the
FTC alleges that Facebook enjoys inelastic demand. That is, even when Facebook was involved
in a series of scandals, such as the Cambridge Analytica affair and Facebook’s two settlements
with the FTC over privacy abuses,97 it did not lose significant users or engagement to
competitors.98 The FTC also alleges that Facebook is able to harm users by decreasing product
quality, for example by abusing their privacy, without losing significant user engagement, and
that “Facebook’s ability to withstand significant user dissatisfaction while experiencing a
minimal loss of user engagement indicates inelastic demand and market power.” While the Court
has not weighed in on whether the FTC has adequately alleged direct evidence, and while it
could be argued in other cases that inelastic demand can simply be the product of a superior,
differentiated service, it is also reasonable that regarding Facebook, which was found to have
significantly harmed user privacy (Facebook agreed to Consent Orders in both 2012 and 2019
with it paying a $5 billion penalty in 2019 99), the lack of loss to the business is suspicious. It is
plausible that in a competitive market, such conduct would have diverted users to a comparable
service with better privacy policies; the fact that this was not the case could certainly be
indicative of monopoly power.
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The FTC also alleges that Facebook has “enjoyed enormous profits for an extended
period of time, suggesting both that it has monopoly power and that its personal social
networking rivals are not able to overcome entry barriers and challenge its dominance.”100 That
is, in a competitive market, the large margin should have drawn rivals to the market in the hopes
of gaining a share of the profit. The FTC alleges that Facebook’s maintenance of a high profit
and market capitalization for 10 years shows that Facebook possesses protected monopoly
power.101 Of course, a high margin is not always indicative of monopoly power – it is plausible
that it could be due to a superior product or service. A firm enjoying the high margin for an
extended period is not foolproof evidence of monopoly power either – if a firm with high margin
and market capitalization engages in innovation, it may be able to enjoy high profits for a long
time due to its possession of products that are superior to that of rivals. However, it can be
argued that Facebook’s sustained high profits, especially when compared with equivalent figures
from rivals 102 and especially considering the fact that the platform receded in quality when it
came to data protection, suggest Facebook enjoyed monopoly power.
All in all, holistically taking the FTC’s allegations into account, the FTC reasonably
alleges that Facebook users’ inelastic demand to high-profile scandals or significant reductions in
quality, as well as Facebook’s long withstanding high profits, are pieces of direct evidence of
Facebook’s monopoly power.
In addition to the methods brought forth by the FTC, there are other ways of procuring
direct evidence of monopoly power. One is the SSNDQ (Small but Significant Non-transitory
Decrease in Quality) test, which is a modification of the SSNIP (Small but Significant and Nontransitory Increase in Price) test. Because the SSNIP test requires the product in question to
charge a positive price, such analysis is impossible when a product is priced at zero; an increase
in price would necessarily be calculated as an infinite increase. Instead, the SSNDQ test
measures the profitability of a marginal degradation of value offered,103 recognizing that in the
context of zero price markets, competition on price can be replaced by competition on quality, 104
and that in the context of digital platforms, this is even likely.105 Specifically, in the case of
multi-sided digital platforms like Facebook, the SSNDQ test would measure the extent to which
the reduction of quality on one side (the provision of PSN services) would decrease the
attractiveness of the platform to those on the other side (advertisers). That is, one must account
for the interactions between the two sides; it is not enough to simply assess the extent to which
decreases in quality would divert users of PSN services to other platforms, it must also consider
the extent to which this would affect advertisers’ perception of the platform’s attractiveness. It is
at this point that an advantage of the SSNDQ test is revealed: according to Evans, in considering
that diversion there is no business or economic reason to limit the inquiry to online platforms that
provide the same service. It is an empirical question whether consumers would turn their
attention to completely different services.106 In other words, there is no need to engage in
discussion of whether two services fall into the same category; the question asked is one of the
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degree to which consumers will divert their attention to other platforms, even if they are not
substitutes.
Of course, the SSNDQ test is not without its limitations. To begin with, quality can be
harder to quantify than price, especially in zero price markets. While it has been suggested that
some dimensions of quality that can be used include privacy, data security, advertising content,
ease of switching and choice in complement markets, innovation, ease of use, and
functionality,107 there is not a consensus on which dimensions are the most appropriate,
especially considering that many multi-sided platforms are highly differentiated. Another issue
regards the operationalization of such dimensions. 108 Not only is there an issue of quantification,
but also one of having to consider the heterogeneous preferences of consumers.109 That is, a
small decrease in quality may cause one consumer to divert their attention to another platform,
but it may not seem as significant in another consumer’s eyes. It has been suggested that
consumer polls or surveys could be a possible technique110 to both quantify qualitative variables
and account for the heterogeneity in preferences. Finally, the multi-sided nature of platforms
such as Facebook complicates the analysis, in that there is another step of analysis that must be
conducted to account for the interdependence of the two sides. Perhaps due to such limitations,
the direct method has been slow to be implemented by courts, with the European Commission
even warning that the “SSNDQ test represents more a conceptual guide than a precise tool to
apply.”111
While the SSNDQ test, when applied to the case of Facebook, would largely be
concerned with quality in the PSN services side, direct evidence of monopoly power can also be
procured in the advertising side.
As an aside, it is worth noting that what is understood by some scholars to be true in the
general category of “multi-sided digital platforms” is not always true regarding Facebook.
Specifically, although Evans states that “market power on each side of a multisided platform,
whether in the form of increasing prices or decreasing quality, is constrained by the risk of losing
sales on the other sides,”112 that is, that “a price increase, or quality decrease, to one group of
participants reduces the demand not only by that group but also by the other groups who then
have fewer participants with which to interact,” 113 this is not necessarily the case in platforms
such as Facebook in which the two sides consist of users and advertisers. Specifically, a price
increase in advertising, and a reduction in demand for advertising, would not also decrease
demand for Facebook’s PSN services. In this case, in which the anticompetitive conduct of
raising prices is directed only at the advertiser and not at users, agencies and courts can apply a
more traditional one-sided analysis.114
Taking this into account, the more traditional method of directly proving direct power, in
which a firm must be found to have profitably raised prices above the competitive level, can be
applied to the advertising side, especially considering that Facebook makes most of its revenue
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from advertisers.115 Although many scholars have argued that power assessments on multi-sided
platforms require considering the reactions that occur on the opposite side, 116 in the case of
Facebook, it is reasonable that proof that it was able to profitably raise prices above the
competitive level in advertising would be indicative of market power. That is, it could be stated
that it is because Facebook enjoys monopoly power in the market for PSN services, and because
a higher price in advertising would not decrease demand for its PSN services, that Facebook is
able to charge a higher price. It must be noted that Facebook has in fact been able to charge
higher prices for its ads: in the full year 2021, average price per ad increased by 24% year-overyear,117 and in Q4 2017 the average price per ad jumped by 43%.118 With price-per-ad being a
quantifiable and trackable measure, this method of proof seems to be a viable option.
C. Anticompetitive Conduct
Regardless of whether one proves a firm’s monopoly power via the indirect method or
the direct method, simply proving monopoly power is not enough; one must also prove that the
firm engaged in anticompetitive conduct, or “the willful . . . maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident.”119 When it comes to mergers, a monopolist’s acquisition of “an
actual or likely potential competitor is properly classified as anticompetitive, for it tends to
augment or reinforce the monopoly by means other than competition on the merits.” 120 That is,
for an acquisition by a monopolist to be classified as “anticompetitive,” it must be demonstrated
that the acquired firm was an actual or likely potential competitor. In addition, anticompetitive
effect, that is, that the acquisitions “harm the competitive process and thereby harm
consumers,”121 must also be demonstrated.
To apply such rules to Facebook’s case, the FTC alleged, and the Court agreed that the
FTC had adequately done so, that Instagram and WhatsApp were competitors to Facebook prior
to their acquisition, and that the acquisitions had harmed consumers in that consumers were
provided lower service quality on privacy and data protection, Facebook engaged in less
innovation on their own and acquired products following the acquisitions, and consumers and
advertisers were faced with less choice.122 While whether the Court will find the facts true is up
in the air, it is notable that despite the FTC mentioning Facebook’s acquisitions of other firms as
well, it also conceded that it does not allege that those acquisitions “each standing alone[]
violated the antitrust laws.”123 In accordance with the concession, the Court limited its discussion
to only Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp.
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This reveals a shortcoming of applying Section 2 of the Sherman Act to acquisitions.
That is, it can be difficult to prove that an acquired firm was a competitor or potential
competitor. Especially when it comes to nascent firms with promising technologies, while they
may have had the potential to develop into formidable rivals, at the time of these acquisitions
few show more than speculative promise. 124 Although speculation, it is reasonable to think that
this was one of the reasons the FTC focused on Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and
WhatsApp in its case – with the two firms having had large, fast-growing user counts at the time
of acquisition, it may have been more straightforward to prove that they were indeed competitors
or potential competitors. Even in the cases of Instagram and WhatsApp, however, Facebook has
presented counterarguments that they were not competitors, and that it is impossible to speculate
on the counterfactual.125
However, this should not deter agencies and courts from giving more attention to
Facebook’s other acquisitions. That is, Facebook’s acquisitions of services such as FriendFeed 126
and Glancee127 should be looked at in more detail; for instance, one could look at their growth
rates and why other companies had wanted to acquire them to infer the likelihood of whether
they could have grown into potential competitors. Even if, as the FTC conceded, these
acquisitions each standing alone may not violate the antitrust laws, the courts should look at such
acquisitions holistically; a continued course of conduct in which Facebook attempted to acquire
firms it itself deemed to be potential competitors should raise suspicion as to its anticompetitive
conduct.
IV. Utilization of Section 7 of the Clayton Act
It is worth noting that while the States Attorney General also invoked Section 7 of the
Clayton Act,128 the FTC did not, choosing to rely solely on Section 2 of the Sherman Act instead.
Compared to Section 2 of the Sherman Act, under which many different forms of actions
can be condemned as long as they constitute monopolization or attempts of monopolization,
Section 7 of the Clayton Act focuses specifically on mergers and acquisitions. Section 7 has a
comparative advantage over Section 2 in that it does not require proof of monopoly power.129
However, while Section 2 charges may (although not always) allow arguments relating to
“course of conduct,” in which a plaintiff argues that the defendant’s behaviors, when combined,
have a synergistic effect that adds up to illegal monopolization, 130 Section 7 charges must focus
on specific mergers and acquisitions. That is, plaintiffs invoking Section 7 face the risk that no
single deal will be deemed sufficiently objectionable when considered in isolation.131 Applying
Section 7 to Facebook, which employed a tactic of acquiring smaller rivals, it may be difficult to
adequately prove that the effect of its acquisitions of WhatsApp or Instagram, let alone those of
even smaller rivals such as FriendFeed and Glancee, were to “substantially lessen
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competition.”132 As such, when it comes to Facebook, it may make more sense to, as the FTC
did, focus on arguing that Facebook engaged in a course of conduct which violated Section 2 of
the Sherman Act rather than risk arguing for individual violations of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act.
V. Conclusion
This paper has thus far examined the existing antitrust laws and how they have been, and
can be, utilized to address Facebook’s possibly anticompetitive acquisitions of small rivals. As
this paper has demonstrated, when it comes to analyzing market power, both the indirect and
direct method have shortcomings. As such, this paper proposes that agencies and courts utilize
both methods, and multiple approaches of each. For instance, one could use multiple metrics as
the FTC did to establish market share pertaining to the indirect method, as well as multiple
approaches including the SSNDQ test and consumer surveys to find monopoly power via the
direct method. If it is the case that fragmented pieces of evidence of monopoly power is found in
both methods, it becomes more likely that Facebook indeed possesses monopoly power. If it is
the case that different approaches provide different conclusions, it will become a matter of
evaluating the conclusions holistically, accounting for the advantages and limitations of each
approach. Regarding anticompetitive conduct, more attention should be paid to Facebook’s
acquisitions of smaller rivals, not just that of WhatsApp and Instagram. While some judges have
been skeptical of concluding that the amalgamation of various behaviors can add up to illegal
monopolization,133 Facebook’s 94 acquisitions, 134 with many of the acquired firms left to become
obsolete or even discontinued, should be examined holistically as a course of conduct.
American antitrust law does not need a new rule, nor should broad-brush regulation be
the preferred method to tackle such dominant digital platforms as Facebook. With multi-sided
digital platforms being extremely differentiated, regulation, with its broadness, may be
ineffective at checking specific anticompetitive behaviors of a certain firm, or it may prevent
firms from engaging in practices which, in their specific context, are in fact beneficial to the
consumer. As such, courts should rely on antitrust law and its case-by-case approach. The
existing antitrust laws are broad enough in their wording to be able to be applied to digital
platforms; however, agencies and courts should consider different ways of interpreting and
applying them in accordance with our changed world.
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